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ABSTRACT 
 
The ventilation design criteria for both road and rail tunnel is based on the design fire defined by the 
standards and the general knowledge about smoke propagation. The problem of such an approach is that it 
considers only the impact on the safety ventilation of the smoke propagation and dispersion inside the 
tunnel excluding other possible accident. However some other situations, such as toxic gas release, are 
possible and even if the aim is not to design the ventilation on other dangerous phenomena with a lower 
occurrence frequency, it must be ensure that the ventilation system does not increase the consequences of 
the accident. Mainly, the problem of toxic gas dispersion is pointed out in this paper. 
Because of the large variety of dangerous materials that can transit in tunnel, the probability of an accident 
that impacts a toxic transport cannot be neglected. In the worst case scenario, such as a massive release of 
high toxic gases, the ventilation is useless because of the toxic quantity that induces a large number of 
deaths inside the tunnel. However, when the toxic release is lower and ventilation can be used, having in 
mind that toxic gas is generally heavy gas or a cold gas, the behaviour will of course be different than the 
one of smoke and the ventilation system may not be adapted for such a situation. This case has scarcely 
been studied yet. 
In this study, both experimental approach and numerical tools were used to improve the global 
understanding of dense gas dispersion in underground infrastructure such as road tunnels. The 
experimental work was achieved in the INERIS fire gallery which represents a 50 m long 1/3rd scale tunnel 
using Argon. It was achieved for different leaks conditions in order to appreciate the dense gas natural 
behaviour. This work has also enabled the comparison between experimental work and CFD calculation 
with FDS code for the particular application of dense gas dispersion. . The work was extended to some 
other configurations and geometry in order to simulate real scale situation with different  kind of gases : a 
highly toxic dense gas such as Chlorine, a light gas stored as a liquid at a very low temperature such as 
Ammonia, and a gas which remains liquid at ambient temperature and pressure and is drained into an 
evaporating pool such as Acrolein. This work will consider the natural behaviour of the gases and the 
influence of longitudinal ventilation both inside and outside of the tunnel. 
 
KEYWORDS: Tunnel, ventilation gas dispersion, toxic release, experimental study, numerical 
simulation 
 
 
Because of the confined geometry, accidents in an underground infrastructure have a high potential of risk. 
The public underground infrastructure can be split into three main categories: road tunnel, rail tunnel and 
underground mass transport system. The risk analysis and the consequences evaluation varies as a function 
of the categories. The two main factors generating this differentiation are: first the intrinsic potential of risk 
of the infrastructure and second the relation between people and the infrastructure. This can be illustrated 
considering first a road tunnel in which hazardous goods transportation is allowed. In such an 
infrastructure, people drive around trucks that may contain hazardous goods such as flammable, explosive 
or toxic products, keeping in mind that people are free of their displacement in case of accident. On the 
opposite, in rail tunnel, people are confined in the trains but they do not circulate in the infrastructure at the 
same time as hazardous goods. Finally, in underground mass transport system, the intrinsic risk potential is 
low considering the lack of hazardous goods. This illustrates the importance of having a safety system for 
underground infrastructure in accordance with the risk level. 
 
This paper is mainly focused on the road tunnel problematic. However, the discussion can be easily 
extended to other infrastructures. 
Concerning road, an important reflexion was achieved during the past years to obtain some references 
scenarios in order to design the safety system for tunnels. In most of the reference guides [1] and in the 
QRA model [2] that is commonly used, thirteen scenarios were identified and correspond to three 
typologies of dangerous phenomena: 
• Fire, 
• Explosion, 
• Toxic release. 
The safety in tunnel, and mainly the ventilation system, is generally designed considering the fire risk. 
According to accidents reported in the past twenty years [3], fire appears to be the phenomena with the 
highest occurrence frequency and of course this approach seems relevant. However, the occurrence of other 
phenomena cannot be considered null and, even if the objective is not to design safety system on these 
scenarios, it is important to investigate how to manage such incident with the available safety system. 
In most of the cases, ventilation in road tunnel is designed with a reference fire. This one is characterized 
by its heat release rate and its kinetic. The reference fire is a way to quantify the risk acceptance level. For 
tunnels allowed to hazardous goods transportation, this reference fire is between 100 MW as in Germany 
and 300 MW as recommended in Netherlands. 
 
Considering fire as relevant scenario for the ventilation design sounds reasonable when considering first 
the occurrence frequency as discussed above and then the ability of the ventilation system to reduce the fire 
damages and casualties,. However, even if the aim is not to manage each accidental situation that can occur 
in tunnel, it seems important to have a global idea on the consequences of the different accidental scenarios 
and the possibility to manage it using an existing fire ventilation system. 
Because of the pressure wave propagation velocity close to the sound velocity, explosion is not a risk easily 
manageable. Consequently, this situation is only dealt with when important consequences are estimated a 
priori, such as a building above the tunnel. In such a case, the tunnel structure is designed to resist to the 
overpressure generated by the explosion. 
 
This paper offers a discussion about toxic gas management in tunnel using fire designed ventilation system. 
Because only few works exist on this topic, this work is a global approach. Three steps were achieved and 
are detailed in this paper. The first important point was the understanding of the physical phenomena 
relative to gas dispersion in tunnel. In this purpose, an experimental campaign was carried out. It was the 
inlet of the second phase that aims to determine the CFD code ability to model the dispersion of heavy 
gases in such a configuration. Finally, using the CFD code, several toxic releases in tunnel were modeled 
to apprehend consequences. Consequences were computed not only inside the tunnel but outside too 
considering atmospheric dispersion at the tunnel heads. 
 
 
GAS BEHAVIOUR IN TUNNELS, AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
 
 
Experimental apparatus 
 
In order to improve the behaviour understanding of an heavy gas cloud in the tunnel with different 
ventilation configurations, an experimental campaign was performed using the INERIS fire gallery. This 
fire gallery is 50 m long and its section was modified to represent a tunnel section with a 1/3 scale with 3 m 
large and 1.8 m high. This gallery is represented on Figure 1. The duct in the upper part of the gallery 
enables to simulate transverse ventilation system. Longitudinal ventilation system is modeled using the 
main extraction fan of the fire gallery. 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Fire gallery characteristics representation. 
 
Indeed, the gallery is equipped with a fan that controls the air flow in the tunnel. Performing experiment at 
a given scale imposes to define the scale’s impact on the dimensionless numbers. The two phenomena are 
the longitudinal flow dynamic represented by the Reynolds number and the buoyancy effect due to the 
density difference between the two gases that is represented by the Froude number. As demonstrated in 
previous papers about the fire part of this experimental campaign ([4] and [5]), this configuration was 
designed to respect the Froude number while keeping the Reynolds in a correct range.  
Because using toxic gases for such experiment is impossible, a representative gas was used. At this stage. it 
appears important to use a gas with a molar weight higher than the one of air, in order to maintain a 
constant air relative density. In addition to prevent thermal effect, the gas injection should be performed at 
surrounding temperature. Experiments were performed using Argon, a neutral gas with a molar weight of 
40 g/mol which induces a relative density of 1.4 with ambient air and using a specific injection device 
heating the gas after its decompression at the tank exit. 
Several questions were a priori asked about gas behavior in tunnel: 
• Is there any stratification of heavy gas dispersing in tunnel? 
• Is there a backlayering such as the one observed in case of fire? 
• Consequently, is it possible to define a critical velocity for such a flow? 
 
Theoretical add 
 
Before discussing about heavy gas behaviour in tunnels, some points must be highlighted mainly 
considering the experimental choices. Argon that was used in these experiments for safety reasons has a 
molecular weight of 40 g/mol that induces a density relative to air of 1.4. Considering that stratification is 
mainly governed by the density gradient between the gas and the air, it appears that for heavier gases the 
weak stratification that was observed should be stronger. As described by [7], the main scaling parameters 
that can be used to evaluate the stratification is the bulk Richardson number defined as: 
²U
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=  (1) 
This means that, for a given ventilation velocity, the higher ρgas is, the more stratified the flow is. This is 
illustrated on Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical curve of flow regime as a function of velocity for different gases. 
 
This curve indicated that, for low flow velocity as those used in the experiments, flow should be stratified. 
This was observed in an “ideal” case: leak directed to the ground, no perturbation inside the tunnel like 
vehicles and no atmospheric disturbance. In such an ideal case, the experimental flow is similar to the 
theoretical one. This curve also shows that the stratification of heavier gas should be stronger than the 
stratification of argon because of their important molar weight. This induces that the influence of external 
parameters will be lower. 
 
 
Experimental design 
 
In order to answer questions mentioned above, the main tool is numerical visualization using several video 
cameras in the fire gallery. Ammonium salt (NH4Cl) was used to seed the invisible Argon gas and then 
enable to visualize the flow. Because this visualization equipment cannot provide measurement values, a 
catharometer coupled with a scrutator was used to obtain a vertical concentration profile. Several 
configurations were experimentally performed to understand impact of different parameters. Experimental 
configurations are listed in Table 1. In this table, the modified parameter between the current case and the 
reference configuration is highlighted. 
 
 
Jet direction 
Leak distance 
from tunnel 
entrance 
Volume flow rate Vehicles 
{1} Reference configuration 
Vertical to the ground – 
40 cm height 15 m 1 000 l/min None 
{2} Counter Flow Horizontal counter flow – 40 cm height 15 m 1 000 l/min None 
{3} Ceiling direction  
Vertical to the ceiling – 
80 cm height 15 m 1 000 l/min None 
{4} Higher rate Vertical to the ground – 40 cm height 15 m 1 500 l/min None 
{5} Reference configuration 
Vertical to the ground – 
40 cm height 10 m 1 000 l/min 
Simulated 1/3rd 
scale cars 
Table 1: Experimental configuration and their characteristics. 
 
 Considering the 1/3 length scale factor of the experimental apparatus, the leak scale factor is (1/3)5/2, this 
means that the experimental leak rate of 1 000 l/min corresponds to a 15 600 l/min (or 0.43 kg/s) flow rate. 
This mass flow rate is representative of a chlorine or ammoniac release through a 10 mm hole for tank at 
ambient temperature and saturated vapor pressure. This hole size is lower than the value given by the QRA 
model that will be discussed later but is closed to the accidental experience. 
 
Reference configuration 
 
To evaluate the impact of the different parameters on the gas behavior in the tunnel, a first reference case 
was defined as follow.  The leak is vertical and directed to the ground with a 40 cm distance between the 
hole and the ground, 15 m downstream the tunnel entrance.  The volume flow rate of the leak is 1000 l/min 
and the tunnel is free of vehicles.  The tunnel is longitudinally ventilated with at a velocity of 0.4 m/s. In 
this configuration a stratified gas layer appears downstream the leak as shown on Figure 3. It must be taken 
into account that only the lower part of the tunnel section were instrumented with 7 probes from the ground 
to 90 cm 15 m downstream the leak. 
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Figure 3: Vertical distribution of Argon concentration 15 m downstream the leak. 
 
To obtain this concentration profile, measured concentrations were averaged in time.  It is important to 
highlight that the instantaneous concentration presents fluctuations.  Furthermore, external perturbations 
could influence the stratification. 
 
Reference case: Numerical approach 
 
On the basis of above described experiments and to go further in the leak impact investigation, a simulation 
software has been used.  The well known CFD code FDS (Fire Dynamic Simulator) was used. Using a 
CFD code implies to be aware about its capability and limit.  Therefore, comparison between its results and 
the experiments enables to have a good overview of the CFD code capability.  
The objective of these simulations is not to validate FDS for gas dispersion modeling in tunnel but to 
evaluate its capability for such an application.  Knowing the limit of the model, we will have a tool for 
extending the experimental approach to real cases. 
The model was built in order to simulate the reference case using FDS.  The fire gallery was modelled 
using a mesh with 25 cm cells in length and 10 cm in height and width. 
Comparison between numerical prediction and experiment is shown on Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Comparison between the FDS prediction and measurement results. 
 
This figure shows that, for the given reference configuration, FDS gives a quite good prediction of the gas 
behaviour. Of course, the two curves are not identical but the flow regime predicted is the good one: the 
flow presents stratification with a concentration higher in the lower part of the tunnel than in the upper one. 
 
 
Impact of the leak direction 
 
To evaluate the impact of the leak direction on the gas behavior, the jet orientation was modified from the 
reference case. Two directions were studied: jet directed counter flow and jet directed to the ceiling. The 
second case is detailed in this paper. For this configuration, the leak is simulated to be on the upper part of 
the truck and consequently the jet is vertical to the ceiling. The ventilation flow, position of the leak and 
the other parameters are identical to the one described for the reference case. The concentration profile 
obtained then is reproduced on Figure 5. The reference case is also plotted on this graph for comparison 
reasons. On this graph, concentration measurements were distributed all along the gallery height to have an 
overview of the whole concentration profile. 
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Figure 5: Vertical distribution of Argon concentration 15 m downstream the leak. 
 
Unlike experimental configuration number 1, the stratification phenomenon does not occur for 
configuration number 3. This figure clearly shows that the concentration is quite homogeneous along the 
tunnel height. This is confirmed by video. Photography from experiment is reproduced on Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Photography of gas dispersion. Jet to the ceiling case, experimental case number 3. 
 
 
Consequences outside the tunnel: an illustration of the experimental configuration 
 
As discussed above, the experimental release of 0.43 kg/s, reported to the tunnel scale, represents a 10 mm 
hole in a tank containing liquid ammoniac or liquid chlorine stored under vapor pressure at 20°C. Before 
going any further, it appears relevant to wonder about the consequences of such a leak outside the tunnel, 
for an estimated real configuration. Considering a 48 m² cross-section tunnel with a ventilation velocity of 
0.7 m/s, corresponding to the experimental velocity converted to real scale, the dispersion was modeled 
using the integral model provided by PHAST. Doing this implies to assume a homogeneous concentration 
at tunnel head. The mass air flow is then around 40 kg/s, which induces a toxic gas mass concentration of 
1%. Computations were achieved for those two cases and results are plotted on Figure 7. Reader must be 
particularly attentive to curve scale that differs because the difference between the two gases threshold. 
 
 
Figure 7: Experimental configuration - toxic gas dispersion outside the tunnel assuming ammoniac 
leak (left) and chlorine leak (right). Non reversible (blue), lethal (green) and significant 
lethal (yellow) for 10 minutes exposure threshold are plotted. 
 
Considering the significant effects outside the tunnel of the free dispersion of chlorine inside the tunnel, it 
is relevant to wonder about the impacts of longitudinal ventilation outside the tunnel. Inside the tunnel, a 
higher ventilation velocity enables to maintain the upstream part of the tunnel free of toxic gases and 
introduces dilution which should to diminish the external effects. The atmospheric dispersion was then 
carried out with a 3 m/s ventilation induced air flow velocity. Dispersion at the tunnel head is plotted on 
Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8: 3 m/s ventilation velocity chlorine dispersion outside the tunnel assuming ammoniac. Non 
reversible (blue), lethal (yellow) and significant lethal (red) for 10 minutes exposure 
threshold are plotted. 
 
This comparison clearly shows the ventilation flow rate impact on the outside gas dispersion: the cloud 
expends a little further widthwise but the footprint is shorter downstream (600m instead of 1050), which is 
beneficial.  
 
Experimental campaign conclusion 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, experimental campaign aims to answer three questions: 
• Is there any stratification of heavy gas dispersing in tunnel? 
• Is there a backlayering such as the one observed in case of a fire? 
• Consequently, is it possible to define a critical velocity for such a flow? 
 
Concerning the first item, the answer is more complex than in fire cases. When dealing with fire cases, hot 
smokes are emitted along a vertical direction from ground to ceiling. Because of the temperature 
difference, smokes are lighter than the ambient air producing a stratification layer. In such case, it is 
possible to define well known stratification criteria [6]. Considering dense gas, such a criterion should be 
based the equation not on temperature but using directly the concentration difference. However the 
pertinence of this parameter appears limited. Indeed, in case of fire, the main is the fire heat release rate. 
The flow in the combustion zone is driven by the free convection phenomena due to the high density of 
heat released. In case of toxic leak, the flow due to the leak is a jet for which the direction cannot be 
predicted. This induces that it appears difficult to have a precise description of toxic cloud dispersion in 
tunnel. It also appears that without considering stratification, using CFD may help to adjust ventilation 
velocity to minimize the effects of toxic gases both inside and outside the tunnel. 
 
 
Figure 9: Observation of a gas layer in the lower part of the tunnel. 
 
These conclusions are not opposite to the possibility to define a critical ventilation regime. Such a regime 
can be used to maintain the upstream part of the tunnel safe. Experiments show that a gas layer in the lower 
part of the tunnel can be observed for some configurations. This phenomenon of a gas layer that goes 
counter flow can be called low-backlayering by similarity with the fire backlayering phenomenon. 
 
In experiments, it appears that this phenomenon is not as stable as smokes stratification in a fire case. The 
gas dispersion was highly depending on gallery surrounding conditions, such as external wind. However, it 
appears clear that, all other parameters fixed, raising the ventilation rate induce a low-backlayering length 
reduction. 
 
This section also shows that the CFD code FDS was able to predict the flow regime in one case of heavy 
gas dispersion in tunnel. This results shows that numerical results is good enough to use the code in order 
to go further and using it to simulate real scale configurations. 
Finally, the comparison of the conditions outside the tunnel in cases with and without ventilation was 
performed, using models based on the experimental results. This shows that ventilation system design for 
fire fighting can be used not only in order to push the cloud downstream the leak in order to prevent the 
toxic gas to invade the whole tunnel but also in order to dilute toxic gas prior to its dispersion in the 
atmosphere. 
 
To summarize, experimental campaign shows that stratification may exist for heavy gas leak in tunnel. 
However this stratification depends on leak configuration and external parameters such as atmospheric 
conditions. Second, experiment shows the possibility to obtain a low-backlayering layer and also the 
possibility to define a critical regime for such dispersion. 
 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF GAS LEACKAGE IN TUNNEL 
 
The toxic release scenario in tunnel is rarely considered. If such a leak is not frequent, such an accident 
would have catastrophic consequences. In the QRA model, several configurations were proposed: 
• 50 mm in diameter hole in a chlorine tank that induces a 45 kg/s liquid leak, 
• 50 mm in diameter hole in a ammoniac tank that induces a 36 kg/s liquid leak, 
• 100 mm in diameter hole in an acrolein tank that induces a 24.8 kg/s liquid leak, 
• 4 mm in diameter hole in an acrolein tank that induces a 0.02 kg/s liquid leak. 
It appears that those values are prudent for evaluating a hazardous line transport as a global view but are 
over estimated for consequences prediction in tunnels.  Accidental experience shows that the hole diameter 
in case of leakage on a hazardous truck is lower than 25 mm. For this reason, a 4kg/s chlorine release was 
chosen to represent the highly toxic gaseous case and a 100 m² pool evaporation was used for toxic liquid. 
Of course, other toxic products can be released and those scenarios just aim to be representative. According 
to these elements, we wonder about the impact of a toxic release in tunnel considering existing system. Gas 
dispersion was modeled in a 400 m long tunnel with a 78 m² section equipped with a ventilation system 
that is able to ensure a longitudinal velocity of 3 m/s. Simulation were achieved using the CFD code FDS. 
 
Chlorine leakage: Consequences of a highly toxic gas 
 
Chlorine was chosen in order to model the consequences of a gas release in tunnel because it is a highly 
toxic heavy gas. Its molar weight is 70 g/mol which induces a density of 2.4 relative to air. Because of the 
high toxicity of this gas, consequences have to be studied not only in the tunnel but outside too. The toxic 
effect thresholds for chlorine are reminded in Table 2. 
 
 1 minute exposure 10 minutes exposure 20 minutes exposure 
 Non reversible toxic effect 110 / 0.03% 41 / 0.01% 30 / 0,007% 
Lethal toxic effect 910 / 0.22% 280 / 0.07% 200 / 0.05% 
Significant lethal effect 1082 / 0.26% 324 / 0.08% 226 / 0.05% 
Table 2 : Chlorine toxic effect threshold concentration in ppm and in mass fraction (ppm / mass 
fraction). 
 
Simulations were achieved to provide a first description of the gas concentration inside and outside the 
tunnel with and without ventilation. In the ventilated case, a 3 m/s ventilation velocity was used. The mass 
release rate of chlorine for these simulations is 4 kg/s. The simulation results of these two configurations 
are plotted on Figure 10 and Figure 11. The maximum concentration on these pictures is set to 0.07% that 
corresponds to the lethal effect for 10 minutes exposure. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 : Mass concentration distribution in a side view centered on the leak five minutes after the 
leak beginning in an unventilated tunnel.  
 
 
 
Figure 11 : Mass concentration distribution in a side view centered on the leak 75 s after the leak 
beginning with 3 m/s ventilation velocity.  
 
These two results show that, for a leak 10 times smaller than the one defined in the QRA model, the 
consequences inside the tunnel would be catastrophic.  
These results also shows that the concentration at the tunnel head is higher than threshold and of course, 
consequences will propagate outside the tunnel. This can in urban configuration cause dramatic 
consequences. To estimate these consequences, the toxic gas dispersion was modeled considering the 
tunnel head as a release with a concentration equal to the average concentration at the outlet.  
Using these averaged concentration and the computed velocity at the tunnel end, an integral dispersion 
model was used to predict the atmospheric dispersion of the toxic cloud. The dispersion results are given 
underneath on Figure 12 for the ventilated tunnel case. Consequences of the unventilated case cannot be 
modeled using an integral model since the velocity at the head is out of the scope of such a model. 
 
 
Figure 12: Toxic cloud footprint of lethal effect for 10 minutes exposure for atmospheric class F3 
(blue line) and D5 (green line) on the left and foot print for F3 class with significant lethal effect for 
1 (red), 10 (yellow) and 20 (green) minutes of exposure on the right. 
 
These results show that, in case of an highly toxic gas release in tunnel, consequences would be 
catastrophic both inside and outside the tunnel, generating consequences up to several kilometers away 
from the tunnel’s head.  
 
Liquid leakage: Pool evaporation consequences 
 
Considering hazardous goods transportation on road, it is important to also consider toxic products which 
remain liquid at ambient temperature and pressure and create a pool which evaporates. Acrolein is 
considered in this paper to provide an overview of such product leak consequences. The toxic thresholds of 
10-4 kg/kg 
10-4 kg/kg 
 this product, given in Table 3 are very low. 
 
 1 minute exposure 10 minutes exposure 20 minutes exposure 
 Non reversible toxic effect 62 8 4 
Lethal toxic effect 557 73 40 
Significant lethal effect 650 85 46 
Table 3 : Acrolein toxic effect threshold concentration in ppm. 
 
To model the toxic effect of such an event, a 100 m² pool was assumed and evaporation was computed 
based on ventilation velocity and pool surface, taking into account the physical characteristics of the 
products. These simulations shows that, toxic thresholds being particularly low for such a product, lethal 
concentrations are easily reached inside the tunnel, as shown on Figure 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Acrolein dispersion in real scale tunnel considering a 3 m/s ventilation velocity. The 
mximum value that is represented is the toxic threshold for 10 minute exposure (73 ppm 
(mol fraction) = 1.4e-4 kg/kg (mass fraction)). 
 
This figure indicates that the toxic gas does not stay stratified downstream the leak but shows that a 3 m/s 
ventilation velocity enables to maintain the upstream part in fresh air.  This case has to be compared with 
the situation without velocity represented underneath on Figure 14. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Acrolein dispersion in real scale tunnel without ventilation. The maximum value that is 
represented is the toxic threshold for 10 minute exposure (73 ppm (mol fraction) = 1.4e-4 
kg/kg (mass fraction)). 
 
In this configuration, the conditions seem better but acrolein will sooner or later mix with fresh air, get 
warmer and lighter and reach men height. So in both cases, the consequences in tunnel are dramatic but at 
least using fire design ventilation system enables to keep part of the tunnel free of toxic gases. This 
solution however induces consequences outside the tunnel because of the release of a large quantity of 
toxic product. The outside effects for a ventilated tunnel were computed using an integral dispersion model 
with PHAST. Dispersion results are plotted on the figure 15 underneath. 
  
 
Figure 15: Acrolein dispersion outside the tunnel, foot print for F3 class with significant lethal effect 
for 1 (red), 10 (yellow) and 20 (green) minutes of exposure duration. 
 
These computations show again the difficulty to manage a toxic gas release in confined geometry such as 
10-4 kg/kg 
10-4 kg/kg 
tunnel. Even if the fire design ventilation system enables to keep the upstream part of the tunnel free of gas 
and then make the evacuation safe for driver blocked in that part, this solution which is good for 
uncongested tunnel, has consequences outside the tunnel that can be worse than for the unventilated case.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper is dedicated to the toxic gas dispersion problem in semi confined infrastructure like road tunnels. 
In these tunnels, the ventilation safety system is commonly based on the design fire curve in order to be 
able to manage smoke. This approach seems relevant considering the occurrence frequency for a fire in 
tunnels as shown in the accidental experiment knowledge. However, in tunnels where hazardous goods 
transportation is allowed, some other accidental scenarios are possible such as explosion or toxic gas 
dispersion. If using the ventilation system for explosion case is not relevant, for the gas dispersion cases the 
ventilation system can be a mean to prevent dramatic consequences. However, we should keep in mind that 
designing the ventilation system for managing dense gas is not realistic, considering the low probality of 
this kind of accident to occur. The objective of this paper was then to propose a reflexion on the fire design 
ventilation system impact on the gas dispersion in tunnels. 
First of all, an experimental campaign is described. This campaign was achieved using Argon in a 1/3rd 
scale model. This campaign enabled us to understand the gas behaviour in the tunnel and mainly the 
influence of several external parameters that directly impact the stratification of the cloud. This campaign 
also enables to evaluate the FDS code capability to predict gas dispersion inside the tunnel. The results 
have shown that using this code for enlarging the scope of the experimental campaign is coherent. Finally, 
on the basis of this experimental campaign, it was possible to have a first discussion on the fire design 
ventilation system impact on the toxic gas dispersion both inside and outside the tunnel. 
In the last part of this paper, some real scale configurations were modelled. This aims to enlarge the scope 
of the experimental campaign as described above. Two cases were discussed: a toxic gas release and an 
evaporating toxic liquid. For both cases, calculations show that consequences inside the tunnel could 
quickly become dramatic. They also show that ventilation system can be used to prevent from having toxic 
gases upstream the leak and then, in uncongested tunnels, to enable drivers protection in that part of the 
tunnel. However, for those two cases, atmospheric dispersion has to be considered in order to have a global 
view of the toxic impact. Using the ventilation system induces a toxic source term from one tunnel entrance 
and the ventilation procedure should be designed in order to minimize the toxic impact not only inside the 
tunnel but also outside. 
This paper is a first reflexion of the available possibilities to manage ventilation system in case of toxic 
release in tunnel. Both the experimental campaign and real cases modelling show that consequences must 
be considered not only inside but also outside the tunnel. 
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